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UNWED FATHERS' RIGHTS IN ADOPTION: THE VIRGINIA
CODE vs. THE UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT
It was an emotional scene: after a long custody battle, Roberta
and Jan DeBoer were forced to give the child they had raised
for two and a half years back to the child's birth parents. Much media
attention surrounded the case of Baby Jessica, who was born
to Cara Clausen on February 8, 1991.' Shortly after the birth,
Clausen and Scott Seefeldt, whom Clausen named as Jessica's
father, signed release of custody forms.2 Roberta and Jan DeBoer
filed a petition for adoption of Jessica; Clausen and Seefeldt's
parental rights to Jessica were terminated; and the DeBoers
transported their new baby from Iowa to their home in Michigan
Nine days after the termination of her parental rights, Clausen
filed a motion to revoke her release of custody.4 In her affidavit,
she stated that she had lied when she claimed that Seefeldt was
the father and that the true father was a man named Daniel
Schmidt.' Schmidt then filed a petition seeking to intervene in
Baby Jessica's adoption proceeding.6 Once Schmidt established
by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the child's biological
father and the DeBoers failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that he had abandoned the child, Schmidt's petition
was granted.7 More than eleven months after the DeBoers took
Baby Jessica into custody, the court determined that the
termination proceeding was void with respect to Schmidt and
that the DeBoers' petition to adopt must be denied.8 The case
continued to bounce around the courts for two years, until Schmidt
was ultimately awarded custody of the child9 and the DeBoers
were forced to relinquish custody of the baby they had raised
as their own for two and a half years. 0
Although the case of Baby Jessica is not the norm, it raises
important questions about the role of unwed fathers in the
adoption process. "This case poignantly demonstrated that the
1. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 502 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Mich. 1993).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 653.
9. Ultimately, Clausen received custody of the child too, as she and Schmidt were
married in 1992. Id. at 657.
10. MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 188 (1994).
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claim of a biological parent, even an unwed father who had
never seen the child, takes legal precedence over the interest of
a child remaining with the only family she had ever known."1
How far should the rights of unwed fathers extend, and how are
these rights balanced with the rights of the birth mother, the
prospective parents, and the child? Each state answers these
questions through its state code. This has led to a variance of
adoption practices throughout the country. In reaction to various
solutions to the same problem, in 1994 the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws12 approved the Uniform
Adoption Act (UAA) as a way to standardize adoption practices
across the country,"3 but it has not yet been adopted by any state.
The UAA differs from the current Virginia Code with regard to
unwed fathers' rights, especially in the area of revoking adoptions.
This note will examine unwed fathers' rights as embodied by the
Virginia Code and consider the effect Virginia's adoption of the UAA
would have on these rights.
While the Virginia Code and the UAA treat many aspects of
adoption similarly, the UAA explicitly considers some possible
situations that could arise involving unwed fathers. 4 The UAA
tends to favor prospective adoptive parents," though until the
UAA is enacted, it is not clear how Virginia courts would ultimately
interpret such cases. The Virginia Code seems to take a more
neutral approach, focusing on the best interests of the child. 6
This approach may favor the prospective adoptive parents who
have been emotionally involved in the child's life. Courts have also
recognized, however, that unwed fathers do have an interest in their
children and have occasionally found that it would be in the best
interests of the child to award custody to the father. Adoption of the
UAA in Virginia, therefore, would not do much to further safeguard
unwed fathers' rights.
11. Id.
12. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws spent five
years trying to develop a uniform statute on adoption. The drafting committee approved
the Uniform Adoption Act on August 4, 1994. The Act was approved by the Family
Law Section of the American Bar Association in October 1994 and the ABA House of
Delegates in February 1995. Catherine Sakach, Note, Withdrawal of Consent for
Adoption: Allocating the Risk. 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 879, 892-93 (1997).
13. Id.
14. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-401 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 50 (1994).
15. See id. at Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 12 (1994).
16. See VA. CODEANN. § 63.2-1205 (Michie 2002).
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FATHERS' RIGHTS: SUPREME COURT CASES
The drafters of the UAA claim that it is consistent with
Supreme Court cases dealing with fathers' rights. 7 The unwed
father has historically been treated as an unfit parent or has
been presumed to have no interest in his child. The Supreme
Court has greatly expanded the rights of unwed fathers over the
years, responding to the realization that an unwed father with an
interest in his child can be a fit parent.
Until the 1972 Supreme Court decision in Stanley v. Illinois,8
unwed birth fathers had no legal rights to their children.19
Illinois state law dictated that children of unwed fathers would
automatically become wards of the state when the mother died.2 °
Although Mr. Stanley had lived with the mother of his children
for eighteen years, had three children with her, and was not
shown to be an unfit parent, when she died, Mr. Stanley lost
custody of his children because he had not married their mother.2"
Under the statute, unwed fathers were presumed to be unfit to
raise their children, while unwed mothers, as well as married,
widowed, or divorced fathers, were all presumed to be fit parents.22
The term "parent" in the statute did not include unwed fathers in
the definition.23 Mr. Stanley raised an equal protection claim that he
was being denied the right to show fitness as a parent on the basis
of his gender.24
The Court held that unwed fathers have an interest in their
children and are entitled to a hearing on their parental fitness before
their children are removed from their custody.2 The Court stated
that the "private interest here, that of a man in the children he
has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
17. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-401 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 50 (1994).
18. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
19. MIRIAM REITZ & KENNETH W. WATSON, ADOPTION AND THE FAMILY SYSTEM 63-
64 (1992).
20. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 647.
23. Id. at 650.
24. Id. at 646.
25. Id. at 658.
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powerful countervailing interest, protection."2 This holding gave
unwed fathers the chance to prove their fitness before having
their children taken away from them, and it provided at least
minimal protection to unwed fathers who had been active in
establishing relationships with their children.27 Stanley did not
put unwed fathers in the same position as unwed mothers, who
have the benefit of a presumption of parental fitness, but the
decision was still a step toward rebutting the traditional views
of unwed fathers as generally absent from their children's lives
and presumably unfit to care for children on their own.2"
Several years later, in Caban v. Mohammed, the Court struck
down a New York statute that treated mothers and fathers
differently with regard to giving consent to adoption.29 The law
allowed unwed mothers to block adoptions by merely withholding
their consent, but an unwed father had no such control, even if
he had developed a significant relationship with his child.3" In order
to block an adoption, the father would have to show that adoption
was not in the child's best interests.31 The statute, therefore,
treated parents differently solely on the basis of sex. In order for
a statute that distinguishes based on sex to withstand an equal
protection challenge, the statute must serve an important
governmental interest and be substantially related to achieving
that interest.3 2 The Court did not find any such interest
embedded in the statute and recognized that the relationships
unwed fathers have with their children could be as substantial
as those between unwed mothers and their children, 3 noting
that "maternal and paternal roles are not invariably different
in importance."3 4 Caban helped to rebut the assumption that
fathers in general, and unwed fathers in particular, were not able
to love and care for their children in the same way as mothers.
Instead of succumbing to the assumption that an unwed father
was unfit to care for his children, the father gained standing
equal to the mother's: he would be presumed fit, and his unfitness
would have to be proven.35
26. Id. at 651.
27. See generally id.
28. See generally id.
29. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 386 (1979).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 388.
33. Id. at 389.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 394.
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The Court extended its discussion of the importance of the
unwed father's fostering a relationship with his children in
protection of his parental rights and articulated the 'best interests
of the child" standard in Quilloin v. Walcott.36 The father in
Quilloin did not petition for legitimation of his child until eleven
years after the child's birth, when the mother's new husband
filed a petition for adoption. 7 The Court, in determining the best
interests of the child, looked to the fact that, for eleven years,
the child had been part of a family unit that wished to adopt
him and during that time, his father sought neither legal nor
physical custody. 8 The father "never shouldered any significant
responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education,
protection, or care of the child."39 Seemingly, the only reason the
birth father wanted to block the child's adoption was to spite the
birth mother's new husband.4" The Court reasoned that it was
best for the child to stay in the unit in which he had grown up.4"
Again in Lehr v. Robertson, the Court emphasized the
importance of an unwed father's active role in his child's life to his
assertion of legal rights to the child.42 Lehr involved a mother who
retained custody of her daughter and subsequently remarried. 3 The
mother's new husband tried to adopt her daughter when the child
was two years old." The biological father claimed that the adoption
was invalid because he was not given advance notice of the adoption
proceedings.45 In finding against the biological father, the Court
commented that mere biology does not merit constitutional
protection" and that the "rights of the parents are a counterpart
of the responsibilities they have assumed." 7 Further, the Court
found that the "existence or nonexistence of a substantial
relationship between parent and child is a relevant criterion in
evaluating both the rights of the parent and the best interest of
the child."48 The father in question had not developed a significant
36. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
37. Id. at 249.
38. Id. at 255.
39. Id. at 256.
40. See id. at 249-50 (noting that the biological father had not filed for 'legitimation"
of the child until immediately after receiving notice of the adoption petition).
41. Id. at 255.
42. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-67 (1983).
43. Id. at 250.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 261.
47. Id. at 257.
48. Id. at 256.
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relationship with his child and did not seek to establish legal ties
to her until she reached the age of two.49 If the father truly had an
interest in the child, the Court held, he could have ensured his
parental rights by signing the putative father registry,50 which
would have notified him of any adoption proceedings enacted
regarding his daughter.5 1
Unwed fathers have gradually gained more rights through
cases such as these. Slowly, the different standards for unwed
fathers and mothers have been broken down, and the ability of
a father to be the primary caregiver for his children is being
recognized. However, the stereotype that unwed fathers will be
absent and do not want a part in their children's lives continues
to fuel many negative attitudes and stereotypes about unwed fathers.
CONSENT TO ADOPTION: THE UAA
Just as the Supreme Court cases focus on the role an unwed
father has played in his child's life, the UAA's standards grant
more rights to a father who has been active in developing a
relationship with his child. The UAA requires consent to an
adoption by both the birth mother and the birth father of a child
born in wedlock.5" It also requires the consent of an unwed father
who has been judicially determined to be the father, or who has
signed a document establishing himself as the father and "has
provided, in accordance with his financial means, reasonable
and consistent payments for the support of the minor and has
visited or communicated with the minor."53 Additionally, the
UAA requires consent from fathers who have received their children
into their home and openly held the children out as their own.54
In determining whose consent to adoption is required, the
UAA makes distinctions based on the involvement of unwed
fathers in the lives of their children,55 distinguishing "the men
49. Id. at 262.
50. Many states have "putative father registries" on which men who may have
fathered children out of wedlock may register their possible paternity. By registering,
which usually involves filling out a registration form and mailing it to the
registry, the putative father will receive notice of any possible adoption actions
involving that child. See, e.g., Department of Children and Family Services, Putative
Father Brochure (2003), available at http://www.state.il.us/dcfsadoption/aadoption-
putative.shtml (providing information on Illinois's Putative Father Registry).
51. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 254.
52. See UNF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-401(a)(1)(i), 9 U.L.A. 49 (1994).
53. Id. § 2-401(a)(1)(iii).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 2-401 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 50 (1994).
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who manifest 'parenting behavior,' and have therefore earned the
right to withhold consent from a proposed adoption of their
children, from the men who fail to perform parental duties and
may therefore be denied the right to veto a proposed adoption. ' 6
The UAA also distinguishes between fathers who willfully
abandon their children and those whose attempts at fatherhood
have been thwarted.5" The thwarted father has somehow been
prevented from meeting his parental responsibilities, because
the mother either never informed him of her pregnancy or the
child's birth, lied to him about her plans for the child, disappeared
with the child, named another man as the birth father, or was
married to another man in a state that presumes the legitimacy
of a child born to a married woman."s According to the UAA,
the unmarried father in these circumstances has not willfully
abandoned his child but has instead been externally prevented
from carrying out his parental responsibilities.59 Thwarted fathers
can assert parental rights during the pendency of adoption
proceedings, but they must prove a compelling reason for not
having performed their parental duties." The thwarted father
must also defend against other parties who try to prove that
termination of his rights is necessary to avoid "detriment or a
risk of substantial harm to the child."6'
The UAA sets out a specific time period during which any
parent whose consent for adoption is required can revoke that
consent. 2 First, consent may be given only after the child is born.63
Second, a parent may unconditionally revoke consent within 192
hours, or eight days, after the birth of the child, no matter
when the consent was given.64 This provision was intended to
take into consideration the best interests of the birth parents by
not pressuring them into making decisions they may later regret,
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. § 2-404, 9 U.L.A. 53 (1994).
63. Id. § 2-404(a).
64. Id.
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as well as to provide a shorter period of uncertainty to prospective
adoptive parents. 65 After the 192 hour time period expires, consent
becomes revocable for only a limited time and in highly specific
circumstances, such as when there is proof of fraud or duress.66
The 192 hour revocation window appears to provide both birth
parents and adoptive parents with a benefit. The birth parents have
eight days during which to consider their decision to relinquish
their parental rights, knowing that they can change their minds
within that window and get their child back. The adoptive parents
know that after the 192 hours have passed, they will not have to
worry about the birth parents trying to reclaim the child. There
still remain, however, 192 hours during which the adoptive parents
will have to fear losing the child they hope to adopt, time during
which emotional bonding can occur. Conversely, the birth parents
may argue that 192 hours is not enough time to make such an
important decision. They may feel pressure during those eight
days equivalent to the pressure they felt when making the initial
decision to give up the child. Thus, they may feel compelled to
change their minds and revoke consent just in case they have
made a mistake.
CONSENT TO ADOPTION: THE VIRGINIA CODE
Virginia's standards in adoption proceedings are set out in the
Virginia Code. 7 This Code provides the guidelines that courts follow
on issues such as deciding what constitutes the best interests of
a child, determining the extent of the rights of incarcerated
fathers, trying to balance the rights of thwarted fathers with
those of other parties involved, and dealing with fathers who try
to withhold consent for adoption. Virginia courts have followed many
of the standards the Supreme Court set forth in its decisions
pertaining to unwed fathers and adoption,6" but there are also
Virginia-specific cases providing authority on these matters.
The Virginia Code requires both parents to consent to the
adoption of a child born in wedlock.69 It is presumed that a child
born in wedlock is the child of the birth mother and her husband,
but this presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of
65. Id. § 2-404 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 54 (1994).
66. Id.
67. See generally VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.2-1200 to -1248 (Michie 2004).
68. See supra notes 17-51 and accompanying text.
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1202(C)(1) (Michie 2004).
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evidence establishing paternity in another man." The consent
of a biological father who is not married to the birth mother
is generally required as well, but there are circumstances in which
this consent is not necessary.7 The Code does not require the
birth father's consent when his identity is not ascertainable.72
It also allows adoption without consent when the father's identity
and whereabouts are known, if notice of the adoption proceeding
is sent to him by registered or certified mail at his last known
address and he fails to object to the proceeding within twenty-
one days of the date on which the notice was mailed. 3 Failing to
appear at the consent hearing has the same effect on the father's
rights as failing to register an objection." The father's consent is
also not required if he has been convicted of certain sexual crimes
and the child was conceived as a result of those crimes." The
court can also grant a petition for adoption without the requisite
consent in certain cases if it determines that the father's consent
is withheld against the best interests of the child.7 6
These instances generally affect the rights of unwed fathers.
For example, a birth father's consent is not required if the
judge certifies that his identity is not "reasonably ascertainable."77
The statute establishes that an "affidavit of the birth mother
that the identity of the birth father is not reasonably ascertainable
shall be sufficient evidence of this fact, provided there is no
other evidence before the circuit court that would refute such
an affidavit.""5
These exceptions to the consent requirement do not effectively
safeguard unwed fathers' rights. There is no specified standard
of proof that the mother must meet to show that the father
is unidentifiable or that she cannot locate him. This lack of a
standard may even discourage unwed mothers from naming
the father because it complicates the adoption process. If she
merely states that she cannot determine who or where the father
70. Id.
71. See generally id. § 63.2-1202(C).
72. Id. § 63.2-1202(C)(2).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 63.2-1202(C)(1). The father does not necessarily have to appear in court himself; he
may instead be represented by counsel. Id.
75. Id. § 63.2-1202(D). For applicable criminal sections of the Code, see id. § 18.2-61 (rape),
§ 18.2-63 (carnal knowledge), and § 18.2-366(B) (incest).
76. Id. § 63.2-1203(A).
77. Id. § 63.2-1203(A)(3).
78. Id.
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is, she saves herself the trouble of dealing with him or allowing
his input regarding the child's fate.
The Virginia Code introduces the "best interests of the child"
standard in section 63.2-1203(A) and defines it in section 63.2-1205.
Courts must use this standard to determine whether failing to grant
a petition for adoption would be detrimental to the child.79 In making
this determination, courts must consider many factors, including
the birth parent(s)' efforts to obtain or maintain legal and
physical custody of the child; whether the birth parent(s)' efforts
to assert parental rights were thwarted by other people; the
birth parent(s)' ability to care for the child; the age of the child;
the quality of any previous relationship between the birth
parent(s) and the child ... ; the duration and suitability of the
child's present custodial environment; and the effect of a
change of physical custody on the child.8"
The Code, however, does not elaborate on how much weight these
factors should be given or how much discretion the judiciary has
in deciding what constitutes the best interests of the child.8'
Virginia courts treat unwed fathers similarly to the Supreme
Court with respect to determining the best interests of the child 2
and recognizing the difference between a purely biological relationship
and a psychological relationship. The state courts have refused to
apply the Stanley decision to cases in which the father had no
prior psychological relationship with his child."s In Commonwealth v.
Hayes, a father sought custody only after the child had been
adopted, but the court refused to apply Stanley because Hayes had
never given any support to and, in fact, had never even seen his
daughter.' The court reasoned that there needed to be some sort of
psychological, rather than merely a biological, relationship between
father and child, such as the formation of a custodial or familial
bond. 5 Granting custody to the father in this case would have also
infringed on the best interests of the child because she had lived
since birth with her adoptive parents.8 6
79. Id. § 63.2-1205.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. See, e.g., Doulgeris v. Bambacus, 127 S.E.2d 145 (Va. 1962).
83. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hayes, 205 S.E.2d 644 (Va. 1974).
84. Id. at 647.
85. See id. (placing importance on financial support as a factor in a father's attempt to
establish such a relationship).
86. Id. at 648.
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Even when both parents' consent to adoption is required, a
court can override a refusal of consent when it finds that adoption
would be in the child's best interests."7 In Hickman v. Futty, the
court found that a mother withheld her consent to her child's
adoption contrary to the child's best interests.8 8 The court based
its decision on the facts that the mother was unable to care for her
child, that she had made no effort to obtain legal or physical
custody of her child, and that the child was over four years of
age and would be emotionally damaged by a change in custody. 9
The Hickman court listed the following factors that it considered
relevant in determining whether failure to grant an adoption
would be detrimental to the child:
(1) the birth parent's efforts to obtain or maintain legal and
physical custody of the child; (2) whether the birth parent's
efforts to assert parental rights were thwarted by other
people; (3) the birth parent's ability to care for the child; (4) the
child's age; (5) the quality of any previous relationship between
the birth parent and the child and between the birth parent and
any other minor children; (6) the duration and suitability of
the child's present custodial environment; and (7) the effect on
the child of a change of physical custody.9"
Weighing these factors helps courts to decide whether petitions for
adoption serve a child's best biological and psychological interests.
In Frye v. Spotte, a Virginia court found that a continued
relationship with their natural father would be detrimental to
his children's welfare.91 Mr. Frye attempted to block the adoption
of his children by their birth mother's husband, but the court
found, after examining his existing relationship with his children,
that Mr. Frye's history of having a violent temper, perpetrating both
spousal and child abuse, and sexually abusing his children
made a continuing relationship with him not in the children's
best interests. Mr. Frye also abandoned his wife and daughters
for another woman, taking all the food in their house with him
and disconnecting the electricity and water when he left. 3 Not only
87. See Hickman v. Futty, 489 S.E.2d 232 (Va. 1997).
88. Id. at 234.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 235 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225.1 (Michie 1995) (superseded by VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.2-1205 (Michie 2004))).
91. Frye v. Spotte, 359 S.E.2d 315 (Va. 1987).
92. Id. at 320.
93. Id.
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did Mr. Frye not support his children, but he engaged in behavior
that was directly harmful and blatantly contrary to their well-being. 4
Mr. Frye's actions, coupled with the fact that he never expressed
an interest in his children until he learned of their stepfather's
intent to adopt them, overwhelmingly convinced the court that
any continued relationship between him and his children would be
detrimental to the children and that Mr. Frye's objection should
not be allowed to block their adoption.9"
Once the required parental consent to an adoption is given, it
is revocable under the Virginia Code only in very limited
circumstances. Consent is "revocable prior to the final order of
adoption"9 6 only where it has been proven that the parent gave
consent under fraud or duress or "upon written, mutual consent of
the birth parents and prospective adoptive parents."97 The Code
states that adoption is not subject to attack after six months
from the final order of adoption, even in the case of "fraud, duress,
failure to give any required notice, failure of any procedural
requirement, or lack of jurisdiction over any person, and such order
shall be final for all purposes."" The State of Virginia has placed
these limitations on challenges to adoptions because it prefers
adoptions to be permanent after a court enters a final adoption
decree. 9 Birth parents attempting to revoke their consent must
raise a claim that fraud or duress was employed in obtaining
their consent '00 - a difficult allegation to substantiate.
Courts rarely make such findings of fraud or duress absent
exigent circumstances. For example, in Harry v. Fisher, a birth
mother executed a written agreement to allow the Fishers to
adopt her child three weeks before the child was born.'"' After the
birth, both the biological mother and her husband executed
their consent to the child's adoption, and the Fishers took
custody of the child the next day." 2 Two months later, the birth
mother sought to regain custody of her child by claiming that
duress, strain, and mental and physical intimidation were used
against her in obtaining her consent. 103 Noting that adoptive
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1204 (Michie 2004).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 63.2-1216.
99. See, e.g., Doulgeris v. Bambacus, 127 S.E.2d 145 (Va. 1962).
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1234 (Michie 2004).
101. Harry v. Fisher, 221 S.E.2d 118, 118 (Va. 1976).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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parents will prevail over an objection to adoption if they can
show by a preponderance of evidence that the child's best interests
will be served by remaining with them,"° the court found that the
mother's consent was freely and knowingly given."° The court found
that the Fishers were proper and suitable custodians and that
the birth mother failed to prove that she was a fit parent.
1 6
Therefore, it was in the child's best interests to stay with the
adoptive parents.107
Any challenge to an adoption must generally be brought
within six months of the final order of adoption, even if the
challenge is based on fraud or lack of notice.1 0 8 Courts, however,
have made exceptions in cases such as F.E. v. G.F.M., in which a
mother and child were involved in an accident that took the life of
the mother and resulted in the child being hospitalized.' 0
The father did not speak English and relied on the child's
maternal grandmother to help with the hospital paperwork."0
The father unknowingly signed papers giving his consent to
adoption, which the grandmother represented were forms to let her
have access to the child's medical information and to allow her to
accompany him to appointments."' During adoption proceedings, the
grandmother falsely reported to the court that her grandson had lived
with her his entire life." 2 The father was never notified of the
adoption proceedings or the adoption itself."3 With no knowledge of
the adoption, the father continued to see and care for his son after
the child was released from the hospital. 114 In 1998, when the father
remarried and asked for his son, the grandmother informed him
that she had adopted the child in 1995, refused to relinquish
custody, and cut off all contact with the father.
115
Strict application of the Virginia statute dealing with the
statute of limitations for challenges to adoptions would have
barred this father from regaining custody of his son, but the court
104. Id. at 119 (pointing out that the execution of consent must also be valid, which it
was in this case).
105. Id. (finding no sign of fraud, duress, or undue influence).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See F.E. v. G.F.M., 547 S.E.2d 531, 536 (Va. 2001) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-237
(Michie 2000)).
109. Id. at 535.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 536.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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found that the six month limitation violated this father's due
process and equal protection rights.116 The court found that the
interest of parents in relationships with their children is
sufficiently fundamental to be included in the liberty interests
protected by the Due Process Clause.'1 ' The court also considered
the difference between biological and "actual" relationships,"'
holding that "[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'coming
forward to participate in the rearing of his child,' his interest
in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection
under the Due Process Clause.""' Such a father has a constitutional
right to a continuing relationship with his children, which may
not be terminated without due process. 2 '
In this case, the court found that the six month limitation
was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to preserve the interests of
the child's stability and the father's right to continue the
relationship."' The father had no reason to know that his parental
rights had been terminated.'2 ' He did not speak English and relied
only on what the grandmother told him in interpreting the consent
forms. 2' The father had no way of knowing that she had lied,
and he was not made aware of the adoption proceedings." 4 He
also could not have known that his relationship with his child
had legally changed because nothing had changed outwardly.1
25
He was still allowed to see the child and did so until the
grandmother refused to allow him to contact the child. 12' The
adoption was finalized without the father's knowledge, through
no fault of his own, and he still maintained a relationship with
his child after the adoption took place."' Therefore, it was
neither in the best interests of the child nor fair to the father
that his parental rights had been terminated.' As this case
illustrates, courts do not always strictly adhere to the statutory
six month standard.
116. Id. at 537.
117. Id. at 538.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 539.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. ld. at 536.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 535.
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Several Virginia courts have also dealt with the question of a
father's rights to his children when he is incarcerated. Linkous
v. Kingery,"9 for example, concerned an incarcerated father
who had only minimal contact with his children. 3 ° The children
visited their father in jail only once, although the father expressed
interest in maintaining a relationship and reuniting with them
at the end of his term of incarceration.' 3 ' In determining the best
interests of the children, without proof of the father's unfitness,
the court looked for the party seeking adoption to show, by clear
and convincing evidence, that allowing a continued relationship
between father and children would be detrimental to the children's
welfare.'3 2  Considering that Mr. Linkous had, before his
incarceration, been a marginal father at best, 33 the court
determined that continuing the relationship in this case would,
in fact, be detrimental to the children." During his incarceration,
Mr. Linkous engaged in further criminal conduct and activities
that prolonged his incarceration and, therefore, his separation
from his children.13 The court also found that Mr. Linkous's action
to block the adoption was not motivated by sincere love for his
children.'36 He merely wanted to keep his children away from
their adoptive parents and resume contact with them at an
undetermined point in the future.'3 7 The court found that the best
interests of the children would not support denying them a stable,
loving relationship in favor of one that was at best unstable
and unpredictable. 3 '
While the court in Linkous declined to hold that the
incarceration of an unwed father made him per se unfit to raise
his children, some situations have arisen in which a father's
incarceration has had that effect. In Winfield v. Urquhart, for
example, the father had been incarcerated for murdering the mother
of his children and wounding the children's stepfather.'39 The
129. 390 S.E.2d 188 (Va. App. 1990).
130. Id. at 189.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 194. This determination is made on a case by case basis.
133. Id. at 195.
134. ld. at 196.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 492 S.E.2d 464, 468 (Va. App. 1997).
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murder and subsequent incarceration resulted in Mr. Winfield's
inability to gain or maintain custody of his children, because he
could not care for them from jail." The children were also unable to
appreciate the circumstances behind their mother's murder and
thus could not make a reasoned choice about their situation.
14 1
The court considered other factors as well, such as the fact that
the children had been in the Urquharts' custody for six years when
the father tried to block their adoption, 14 2 but ultimately found
that the circumstances behind his crimes alone were enough
to prove the father's unfitness to parent. I" The court found that
withholding consent to the adoption would deny the children
stability and be detrimental to their well-being.
144
The Virginia Code thus places heavy weight on the factors
used to decide what is in the best interests of a child. In most cases,
custody is awarded to whoever has been most demonstrably active
in caring for and raising the child. Courts have not held biological
relation to be an overriding factor, looking instead at the fitness of
the biological and adoptive parents, the child's current situation
and stability, and, in some egregious instances, fraud and duress in
the execution of the adoption.
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: A CLOSER LOOK
In determining custody cases Virginia courts have traditionally
used the best interests of the child standard, which has been
described as "the universal principle guiding the adjudication
of all matters concerning the welfare of the child."'45 There are
generally three parties whose rights must be taken into
consideration in adoption cases: the birth parents, the adoptive
parents, and the child. When the parties have the same interests
in mind, they can usually work together to do what is best for
everyone involved. When the parties have competing interests,
however, courts must often step in and determine whose rights
will prevail in a given situation.
Of course, the welfare of the child should always be a priority
in the minds of everyone involved in custody matters. The problem
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 469.
144. Id. at 470.
145. CLAIRE BREEN, THE STANDARD OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: A
WESTERN TRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 1 (2002).
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lies in figuring out what is best for the child. There has been
much discussion about biology and psychology, genetics versus
interaction. These two concepts do not necessarily always overlap:
"Whether any adult becomes the psychological parent of a child
is based . . . on day-to-day interaction, companionship, and
shared experiences, '  more than on genetics alone. Courts
have often made the distinction between the biological father,
the man involved in conceiving the child, and the psychological
or social father, the person who is involved in the child's life
and contributes to his or her upbringing.147 A biological relationship
gives the birth parents the "first right to the possession of
the child."14 The birth parents keep this right unless they decide
to give their child up for adoption, or unless the state finds that
the child has been neglected or delinquent or that the parents
are unfit.'49 When an unwed father is not involved in his child's
life, the question of biology and psychology must come into play.
150
In order to determine whether the biological father and the
psychological father are in fact the same person, courts can look to
three areas of filial obligations: personal care, financial support,
and accommodation.15 1
The traditional view of unwed fathers is that their only
contribution is biological:" 2 'The birth father is often viewed as an
illusory entity whose only link with this child is his involvement in
the biological event."'5 3 The man will help create the child, but
then he will not want any responsibility in raising the child.1 54
While this view may be based at least partially in reality, and
courts took this purely biological view until the Stanley decision
in 1972,155 it is certainly not true for all unwed fathers. Until
Stanley, "birth fathers who were not married to the birth mothers
of their children had no legal rights with respect to the children
146. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ETAL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 19 (1973).
147. GARY CLAPTON, BIRTH FATHERS AND THEIR ADOPTION EXPERIENCES 31 (2003).
148. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 146, at 16.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. CLAPTON, supra note 147, at 176.
152. Id. at 40.
153. Pai Sachdev, The Rights of Birth Fathers Must Be Protected, in ADOPTION: OPPOSING
VIEWPOINTS 77 (David Bender & Bruno Leone eds., 1991).
154. CLAPTON, supra note 147, at 40.
155. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); see also discussion of Stanley, supra
notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
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they fathered." 56 Stanley recognized that an unwed father can
care for and nurture his children and that he should be given the
opportunity to do so if he desires.1"7
When a father takes an interest in his child and is involved in
that child's life, he becomes not only the child's biological father
but the child's psychological father as well. While a child may feel
a bond to a biological parent as a result of the blood relation, it is
"day-to-day" interaction that will ultimately become the crux of
the relationship:
[Flor the child, the physical realities of his conception and birth
are not the direct cause of his emotional attachment. This
attachment results from day-to-day attention to his needs for
physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection, and stimulation.
Only a parent who provides for these needs will build a
psychological relationship to the child on the basis of the
biological one and will become his "psychological parent" in
whose care the child can feel valued and "wanted."5'
By this analysis, the number of biological parents a child can have
is limited, but anyone could potentially become a psychological parent.
A parent's absence can easily break a purely biological bond,
especially soon after birth, when the child has no awareness of
his or her relationship to his or her parents. Unlike their parents,
"children have no psychological conception of relationship by blood-tie
until quite late in their development." 59 Parents not only possess
the awareness and capacity to form such relationships, but
also have already become emotionally invested in the child due
to the process of conceiving, carrying and giving birth to the
child, or being involved during the pregnancy in the case of
fathers. 160 The child, however, will not begin to realize these
relationships until later in his or her development and will
naturally bond to those most involved in his or her upbringing.'61
As noted by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, "[tihe 'family,'
however defined by society, is generally perceived as the
fundamental unit responsible for and capable of providing a child
on a continuing basis with an environment which serves his
156. REITZ & WATSON, supra note 19, at 63-64.
157. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
158. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 146, at 17.
159. Id. at 12.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 12-13.
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numerous physical and mental needs during immaturity."16 2 The
family unit traditionally consists of people who are related
biologically, but a person will generally consider 'family' to be
those people who have provided love and support. This support can
come from either biological or adoptive parents, but not from an
absent or inactive parent.r' An inactive parent may be biologically
related to the child, but biology alone will not always give rise to
parental rights to that child.
One of the most important concepts in forming a relationship
with a child is that of continuity: "Continuity of relationships,
surroundings, and environmental influence are essential for
a child's normal development."6 4 Breaks in continuity of
relationships can be damaging to a child and may cause infants up
to eighteen months of age to refuse food, have difficulty sleeping,
and cry excessively.165 Infants and toddlers who suffer from
disrupted continuity may also become less trusting.166 Early
adoption allows an uninterrupted psychological bond to form
between the child and the adoptive parents.'6 7 This bond is
harder to establish later in the child's life, when the child has
already formed such relationships or has already grown less
trusting due to broken relationships.'68 The permanence of
parental relationships affords continuity in a child's life. 69 A
protracted custody battle presents the possibility that a parental
relationship will be disrupted; it also leaves the parties involved
unsure whether their parental relationship will be interrupted. 7 '
This fear of interruption, especially in the waiting period between
the adoptive placement of a child and the final order of adoption,
can have a detrimental impact on the health and well-being of
the child. 7' For this reason, final custody decisions should be made
as quickly as possible; "[procedural and substantive decisions
should not exceed the time that the child-to-be-placed can endure
loss and uncertainty."
172
162. Id. at 13.
163. Id. at 19.
164. Id. at 31-32.
165. Id. at 32.
166. Id. at 32-33.
167. Id. at 22.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 35.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 31-35.
172. Id. at 42.
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THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE
Determining what is best for a child is a difficult and often time
consuming task. It is not possible to envision every potential
outcome or to realize all the future circumstances that could affect
the decision. Therefore, instead of trying to determine what would
be in the best interests of the child, placement decisions should be
treated as emergencies and made within the minimum amount of
time necessary for a reasoned judgment.17 3 "Prompt appeal and
decision safeguard not only the interest of the child," '74 but also
the interests of "aggrieved adult parties." '175
The placement process is not perfect, and not every
circumstance can be predicted. Instead of taking a great deal
of time to determine the absolute best situation, courts should
focus on finding the "least detrimental available alternative
for safeguarding the child's growth and development." '76 This
standard is defined as:
[T]hat specific placement and procedure for placement which
maximizes, in accord with the child's sense of time and on
the basis of short-term predictions given the limitations of
knowledge, his or her opportunity for being wanted and for
maintaining on a continuous basis a relationship with at least
one adult who is or will become his psychological parent.7 '
This standard is similar to the best interests of the child standard
but also takes into account the time pressures associated with
changing the custody of a child.
The longer a custody dispute is dragged out, the more harmful
it is to all parties involved. Adoptive parents become more
emotionally attached to the child and suffer from the insecurity
of not knowing whether they will be able to keep the child.
Biological parents suffer from the uncertainty of not knowing
whether they will get their child back. The child also suffers from
changes in environment and the possibility of having established
emotional bonds broken. The possible detriment only increases
as the child grows older and forms stronger and more complex
emotional bonds with the people who have taken care of him or
173. Id. at 43.
174. Id. at 46.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 53.
177. Id.
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her. The child may not understand why he or she is being taken
away from the only people he or she recognizes as parents. These
emotional issues become even more complicated when a father who
did not know he had a child, or who has somehow been kept from
his child, enters the picture.
A SPECIAL CASE: THE THWARTED FATHER
Not all unwed fathers who do not take care of their children
have made conscious choices not to raise their children. There is
a class of fathers who are either unaware that they are fathers
or whose efforts at raising their children have somehow been
thwarted by the birth mother or some other third party.178
Treatment of the thwarted father is especially problematic: the
thwarted father has tried to support or have contact with his
children, but his efforts have been frustrated by the mother placing
the children for adoption behind his back, moving away with
the children without telling him, or using some other method
of preventing him from gaining access to his children.179 The issue
that arises is whether the thwarted father's rights to his child
trump those of potential adoptive parents." ° The Supreme Court
has not yet "squarely resolve[d] what should be done with the father
who . . . has done everything he reasonably could to establish a
relationship with his child but who has been thwarted by
circumstances beyond his control."' 1
The Virginia Code allows parental consent to adoptions to
be revoked prior to the final order of adoption, but only "upon proof
of fraud or duress."'8 2 The Code, however, does not permit revocation
of consent, even for fraud or duress, after six months from the date
of entry of the final order of adoption,1 3 but courts have not
always followed this rule strictly, making exceptions in cases with
special circumstances.' 84 For example, in F.E. v. G.F.M., the court
held that the statute unconstitutionally violated due process as the
time limitation "affected [the] father's fundamental right to
178. David D. Meyer, Family lies: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless
Father, 41 ARiz. L. REV. 753, 763 (1999).
179. See generally id. (discussing multiple thwarted-father cases).
180. See id. at 754-56 (illustrating this point with a discussion of the "Baby Richard" case,
In re Doe, 159 Ill.2d 347 (1994)).
181. Id. at 763.
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1204 (Michie 2004).
183. Id. § 63.2-1216.
184. See, e.g., F.E. v. G.F.M., 547 S.E.2d 531 (Va. App. 2001); see also discussion of
F.E., supra notes 108-28 and accompanying text.
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maintain that relationship with his son .... "185 This relationship
was demonstrated by the father's continued contact with his child
after the child had been adopted by the child's grandmother without
the father's knowledge.18
The UAA allows the thwarted father to challenge an adoption
before the adoption decree has been entered:
A thwarted father may succeed in blocking an adoption if he
not only can prove a "compelling reason" for not having
performed parental duties but successfully defends against
an effort by the prospective adoptive parents, the birth mother,
or an agency to prove that termination of a thwarted father's
rights is necessary to avoid detriment or a risk of substantial
harm to the child.'87
The thwarted father thus does not get automatic access to his child.
The UAA is "premised on the belief that children's ties are to the
individuals who actually parent them - or who are committed to
parenting them - and [who] deserve legal protection even if those
ties are psychologically and socially constructed and not biologically
rooted." 18 8 Just like the Virginia Code, the comment to the UAA
states that a thwarted father may not challenge an adoption more
than six months after the adoption decree has been issued.'89
Because the UAA has not been enacted, however, there is no case law
to determine how strictly Virginia's courts would treat this rule.
The UAA and the Virginia Code have similar standards when
it comes to thwarted fathers. The Virginia Code seems to focus on
fraud or duress when allowing an adoption to be revoked. 9 ' It
also focuses on the psychological relationship a father has built
with his child and the best interests of the child standard.1 9' Courts
generally try to protect the parental relationship that has already
developed, even if the father's rights to his child were thwarted.
192
Courts have generally treated the loss of the opportunity for a
potential relationship as less substantial than the loss of an
existing human bond. 93 This makes it hard for a thwarted father
185. F.E., 547 S.E.2d at 538-39.
186. Id. at 539.
187. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-401 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 50 (1994).
188. Sakach, supra note 12, at 893.
189. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-401 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 50 (1994).
190. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1204 (Michie 2004).
191. Id.
192. Meyer, supra note 178, at 763-64.
193. Id. at 764.
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to show that it is in the best interests of the child for him to get
custody. Even though it may not be the fathers fault that he has not
had contact with his child, the fact remains that he has not formed
an emotional bond with the child, while the prospective adoptive
parents have had that opportunity. Thus, it seems that courts will
generally favor prospective adoptive parents, except for extreme cases
such as F.E. v.G.F.M. 194
The UAA also tends to benefit parents who have developed
a psychological relationship with their child. The comment to
section 2-401, however, directly addresses the question of a thwarted
father.19 Once the father has shown a compelling reason why he
has not been able to have contact with his child (essentially,
how he has been thwarted), he needs only to defend against the
claim that terminating his parental rights is "necessary to avoid
detriment or a risk of substantial harm to the child."19 The UAA
does not use the phrase "best interests of the child" but does take
into account factors such as the relationship between the child's
birth parents, the amount of time the child was out of their custody,
and independent grounds for terminating the rights of the birth
parents.'97 These factors do not appear to be as strict as those
set forth by the Virginia Code.
CONCLUSION
While both the UAA and the Virginia Code sections dealing
with adoption purport to do what is in the "best interests of the
child," the UAA on its face seems to be more supportive of unwed
fathers' rights. The UAA specifically mentions the thwarted father
and provides standards for dealing with his situation. It recognizes
that not all fathers are intentionally unsupportive of their children
and distinguishes between cases in which fathers are simply
irresponsible or unresponsive to their children and cases in which
fathers have a genuine interest in having a relationship with their
children but are blocked from fulfilling that interest by some
outside force. Adoption law has historically been focused mainly
on the birth mother's rights, but the UAA expands that focus to
include the birth father's rights as well.
194. 547 S.E.2d at 536.
195. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-401 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 50 (1994).
196. Id.
197. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-408 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 61 (1994).
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The UAA mainly focuses, however, on the best interests of the
child, and it seems to favor the adoptive parents by making the
revocation period shorter and more permanent. The UAA also
appears to provide additional protection to birth parents by offering
them an absolute period during which they can revoke their consent
to their child's adoption. This period, however, is for such a short time
after the birth of the child that it may give a false sense of control
to the birth parents. This is especially true in the case of a thwarted
father, who is not likely to raise an objection to the adoption within
192 hours because he is likely not even aware of the child's
birth or the adoption proceedings within that time.
Like the UAA, the Virginia Code also tends to focus on what
is in the best interests of the child, but it often seems to assume
that keeping a child with his or her prospective adoptive family
is better for the child than being returned to an interested and
willing biological father who has had his rights infringed upon by
others. It does not mention the unwed father specifically, other
than in a listing of parties required to give consent to adoption.
While the Virginia Code may not appear to do much for unwed
fathers on its face, Virginia courts have sometimes allowed
exceptions when the unwed father's rights have been substantially
impaired and when there would be no detriment to the child.
Both the Virginia Code and the UAA attempt to adhere to what is
in the best interests of the child, which is ultimately the most
important aspect of the adoption process. Courts applying the
Virginia Code seem to be a bit more flexible in examining the
circumstances of a given situation and allowing a thwarted father to
regain custody than the UAA suggests it would allow. Even though
it seems to support the unwed father's rights on its face, the UAA
tends to favor the adoptive family. Therefore, it may not really
provide much extra protection to unwed fathers. It is likely that
cases decided under the UAA will turn out very much like those
decided under the Virginia Code. Adopting the UAA is therefore
unlikely to provide any new benefits to unwed fathers in Virginia,
even though it more explicitly recognizes their interests.
Adoption cases are unique because of the emotions involved
and the fact that the outcome will greatly affect the child's life.
Courts are not always able to look into the future and see what
will be in the child's best interests, yet they are forced to make
these decisions every day. States and courts may continue
the trend of recognizing birth fathers' rights, perhaps by adopting
the UAA, whether or not it actually grants unwed fathers more
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rights, or they may further restrict adoption laws to make
revocation of consent more difficult. Whichever route they take,
courts will always be involved in the battle among the rights of
the birth parents, the rights of the prospective adoptive parents,
and the best interests of the child.
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